Behind the veil of Russian rural ‘quietness’. by Mamonova, N.V. (Natalia)
 
Paper was presented at 
Food, Farmland and Forests in Transition: The Eurasian countryside 25 years after 
7 November 2014, Romanian Academy of Sciences, Bucharest 
 
 
Behind the veil of Russian rural ‘quietness’. 






Poverty, mass unemployment, social exclusion, and violation of small-holders’ land rights 
have become the scourge of Russian countryside after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Under such conditions one could expect an outright social resistance and large-scale protests, 
while Russian rural dwellers seem to show remarkable tolerance and peaceful acceptance of 
existing deprivation and inequality. The peacefulness and endurance of the post-soviet rural 
population are often explained by the socialist history and contemporary non-democratic 
regimes, which create a structure that prevents dissenting expressions. This research looks 
beyond this common explanation, and aims to understand the so-called post-Soviet rural 
‘quietness’ by studying different spaces for contestation. These spaces (social, economic, 
political and cultural) influence rural dwellers’ perceptions and practices, thereby, their 
attitude to the existing order and politics of change. By analysing various dimensions of rural 
everydayness this research explains why the existing socio-economic tensions in rural Russia 
do not escalate to a civil protest and large-scale mobilisation. This analysis aims to contribute 
to a better understanding of peasant politics, social relations, and mobilisation practices in 




The post-Soviet rural society is considered to be conservative, fatalistic, and politically passive 
(O'Brien and Wegren 2002). Mamonova (2015) writes: ‘while globally it is reported that peasants are 
fighting against land grabbing, Ukrainian rural dwellers show tolerance and peaceful acceptance of 
land grab-related changes’(p.XX). Mamonova and Visser (2014), in their study of contemporary rural 
social movements in Russia, reveal weak ties between civil organisations and the rural population. 
Rural Russians rarely engage in political actions, despite frequent violations of their rights. Petrick et 
al. (2013) argue that rural Kazakhs do not resist large-scale agricultural development in the country, 
and chose peaceful mechanisms of adaptation to the recent changes. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, former Soviet republics launched land reforms which aimed to 
distribute lands of kolkhozy and sovkhozy (collective and state farms) to rural households in order to 
establish a family farming sector, and, according to some, to empower the rural population (Visser 
2003). Although land distributions were pursued under different schemes in these countries, the 
outcome was roughly similar for the large agricultural producers of the former Soviet Union (Russia, 
Ukraine, and Kazakhstan): family farmers emerged in a very limited manner, the former collective 
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farms went bankrupt, and the majority of the rural population fell into deep poverty and experienced 
social exclusion and high unemployment. The agricultural land became controlled by large farm 
enterprises (LFEs) – successors of former collectives, and rural dwellers were left with minuscule 
household plots, where they conducted subsistence agriculture, and showed nearly no resistance to the 
growing deprivation and inequality (Spoor et al. 2013) 
The word ‘quiet’ often became used in the academic literature to describe the behaviours of the post-
socialist (rural) population. Thus, Smith and Jehlicka (2013) introduced the term ‘quiet sustainability’ 
to define widely practised and environmentally sustainable food self-provisioning in post-socialist 
Poland and Czechia. These practices are not accompanied by explicit discourses and social 
movements, which justifies the presence of the word ‘quiet’ in their name. Visser et al. (2015) further 
develop the idea of ‘quietness’, and propose the term ‘quiet food sovereignty’ to describe small-scale 
food production by the rural (and urban) Russian population. According to the authors, such food is 
not only ecologically and manually produced for self-consumption or sale on domestic markets, but 
also responds to traditional and cultural understandings of food and farming, thereby coinciding with 
the international definition of food sovereignty2. The main difference between international and 
Russian food sovereignties lies in the absence of overt struggles or mobilisation among the Russian 
rural population to defend its way of life.  
The present study is aimed to investigate the post-Soviet civil ‘quietness3’ through the example of 
rural Russia. It addresses the following three questions: What are the factors that define the absence of 
overt rural resistance and social mobilisation in the post-Soviet rural settings? Why do focal forms of 
individual resistance not build into mass collective protest? What is behind the observed ‘quietness’ 
of post-soviet rural dwellers, and under which conditions can it lead to mobilisation and revolt? This 
study investigates rural responses not to a particular strain, but to whole array of contemporary socio-
economic problems in the countryside: poverty, inequality, power discrepancies, smallholders’ land 
rights deprivation, social and economic exclusion, etc.   
Many authors explain the absence of resistance among post-Soviet rural population by the history of 
70 years of socialism, when the expression of disagreement with state actions was at least heavily 
condemned, and serious protest led to deportation in the Gulag labour camps during Stalin’s reign or 
prosecution in later periods (Visser 2010, Beissinger 2002). The contemporary authoritarian regime of 
Putin, which is able to repress, divide, and demobilize undesired civil protests, is often referred as the 
core factor that limits social mobilisation in Russia (Mamonova and Visser 2014). However, the 
socialist history and current repressive regime do not lead to the absence of collective resistance and 
bottom-up mobilisation in rural China, where protests against land grabs and fraudulent village 
elections have become contentious issues (He and Xue, 2014). Similarly non-democratic former-
socialist countries in Africa face an outright rural mobilisation against the deprivation of land rights 
and social exclusion (see for example Neimark (2003) on Madagascan rural protest, and Pitcher 
(1998) on land struggles in Mozambique).  
This study goes beyond the common explanations of the post-soviet rural ‘quietness’, and aims to 
look at this phenomenon from another angle. Contentious politics are often studied either from 
rationalist (focusing on rational action), structuralist (focusing on social structure), or culturalist 
(focusing on collective behaviour and relative deprivation) approaches. The analysis of the post-soviet 
rural ‘quietness’ requires a different research strategy, as the objects of study (i.e. protest and 
mobilisation) do not explicitly pronounced. The proposed framework is built on an analysis of 
potentials for collective protests. It introduces the concept of spaces for contestation and distinguishes 
political, economic, social, and cultural spaces in which Russian rural dwellers live and build relations 
with each other, other social agents, and their surroundings. This framework combines the subjective 
experience of social actors and the objective factors that structure the repertory available to 
2 The Nyéléni food sovereignty declaration defines food sovereignty as: ‘the right of peoples to health and culturally 
appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own food and 
agriculture systems’(Nyéléni 2007). 
3 i.e. the inability of a deprived population to address their issues through mobilisation and collective protest. 
                                                          
(potential)protestors, and, therefore, brings the society-centric dimensions into the structural analysis 
of the post-soviet rural ‘quietness’. 
The notion of spaces in this paper is based on Löw’s (2008) ‘duality of space’, in which space is the 
context for and result of social practices. Space is generated through social actors’ perceptions and 
activities, and simultaneously determines them. The diversity of the analysed spaces is based on 
Giddens’ (1984) concepts of structures (e.g. economic, political structures) and structure, which unites 
individual structures into one multidimensional formation. Similarly, various spaces for contestation 
interact and coalesce with each other, thereby creating a multidimensional space, which defines the 
milieu for contentious politics.  
The majority of studies on post-socialist spaces of the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc countries are 
urban-based. Cities are recognised to be at the vanguard of post-socialist transformations, which 
include the creation of new urban identities, the globalisation and decolonisation of spaces, the 
construction of positive or negative perceptions about the Soviet past, etc. (Young and Kaczmarek 
2008, Rozhanskiy 2013). Rural spaces, which are significantly more conservative, present an 
interesting case of a hybrid culture: they contain Soviet values in the everyday life of rural dwellers, 
and capitalist symbols such as privatization, marketization and private land investments. Furthermore, 
the multidimensional analysis of rural everydayness explains not only the ‘quietness’ of post-Soviet 
rural population, but it reveals internal processes in society, which define societal viability and 
resilience, and, thereby, its ability to survive in a hardship. 
This research is based on fieldwork conducted in the Russian region of Stavropol Krai during June-
July 2014. The Stavropol Krai is an important agricultural region with a large rural population (42.8% 
of population) which features the coexistence of various forms of farming (large-scale industrial 
agriculture, private family farming, and small-scale peasant households). Semi-structured in-depth 
interviews were conducted with 28 rural households, 15 private family farmers, 5 LFEs executives, 
and 10 LFEs workers in three rayony (districts) of the Stavropol Krai: the Novoalexandrovskiy, 
Grachevskiy, and Arzgirskiy rayony. These rayony are different in terms of soil fertility, population 
density, agricultural specialisation, and distance to Stavropol – the provincial capital and largest urban 
centre in the region4 . In the data analysis, much attention was devoted to the respondents’ discourses 
about social and economic relations in rural areas, national and local politics, and the norms and 
values dominating in their respective locales. Discursive consciousness, that is to say all the things 
that social actors are capable of expressing in words, defines everyday practices and perceptions (Löw 
2008), which are the building blocks for different spaces for contestation. Therefore, many direct 
quotes are presented in this article in order to reveal the verbal expressions of the analysed spaces. 
Furthermore, a number of secondary literature and official statistical data are used in this analysis in 
order to explain the objective dimensions of prospects for contentious politics in the Russian 
countryside. This study also benefits from my earlier fieldwork in central Russia (the Moscow and 
Vladimir regions) during 2009-2013.  
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section I explain the concepts of different spaces for 
contestation. The third section provides an overview of rural response strategies during the Soviet and 
post-Soviet periods. The social, economic, political and cultural spaces for contestation are analysed 
in the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh sections, respectively. The concluding section returns to the 
4 The Grachevskiy rayon is located in the western-central part of the Kray and is the closest (among the analysed districts) to 
the largest urban centre – Stavropol. This district possess the most fertile soil, known as Black Earth (or Chernozem) and has 
a steppe landscape. The agricultural specialisation of this district is crop production, mainly winter wheat and sunflower. 
Livestock is only held by the rural population. There are 9 modern LFEs and 275 private family farms. Among the many 
family farms, few are profitable. LFEs hold the leading position at the local agricultural market. (2) The Novoalexandrovsky 
rayon is located in the north-western part of the Stavropol Krai. Although its soil is fertile (Black Earth), it is located in a 
zone of unstable moistening. There are 14 FLEs which are Soviet-style farms, five of which retain the word ‘kolkhoz’ 
(collective farm) in their names. Independent private farmers are relatively successful here; their size and scale are the 
largest in the Kray. Private farmers occupy 68% of farmland. All major crops, including winter wheat, sunflower, and sugar 
beets are produced here. (3) The Arzgirskiy rayon is the most distant district from the city of Stavropol. It is located in the 
north-eastern part of the Stavropol Krai. The soils are less fertile (light-brown and solonets). This district is characterized by 
an arid climate. There are 17 LFEs (some of them of soviet-style, some fully modernised), and 224 private family farmers. 
Livestock and crop farming are dominant agricultural activities among LFEs and small- and medium-scale farmers. 
                                                          
questions raised in the beginning of this paper and discusses the conditions under which the analysed 
rural ‘quietness’ may transform to an open collective resistance.  
 
2. Theorising the spaces for contestation 
In the social sciences, space is viewed as an integral component of societal processes. Several 
definitions of space exist. The absolutist understanding of space sees it as a discrete unit or a 
container, in which social actions take place (Aristotle, Newton). However, the relativistic approach is 
more dominant among scholars today; it allows spaces to present a variety of appearances depending 
on the standpoint of the observer and various elements which surround and pervade the given space 
(Löw 2001, Giddens 1984, Bourdieu 1991). Therefore, the understanding of space moved to 
something more than just the backdrop against which societal developments take place, and became 
the dynamic expression of societal processes (Stoetzer 2008). 
The contemporary academic debates on space are focused on the role of space (either passive or 
active) in relation to social events. The structure-theoretical perspective is anchored in the notion that 
space has the power to provoke social events (Lefèbvre 1991), while action theory conceptualizes 
space mainly as a result of or context for social action (Giddens 1984). This paper considers space as 
a combination of both approaches and uses the ‘duality of space’ concept proposed by Löw (2001, 
2008). This position is largely based on Giddens' (1984) theory of structuration, and his concept of the 
‘duality of structure’. However, Giddens believed that societal structures do not have a rigidly 
determinative effect but are rather the medium and outcome of repeated action. The basic idea of 
Löw’s ‘duality of space’ is that individuals act as social agents and constitute spaces in the process, 
but that their action depends on the spaces they cohabit. Löw distinguishes two processes which 
constitute space: spacing and synthesis. Spacing is ‘the positioning of social objects and people and of 
primarily symbolic markings in order to denote as such ensembles of objects and people’ (Löw 2001, 
158). The synthesis is necessary in the structuring of space: people produce spaces through processes 
of perception, imagination and remembering. 
The understanding of spacing and synthesis is important for the explanation of the ‘quietness’ of the 
post-Soviet rural population. These processes determine the actual and conceived impact of the strain 
in a given context, and the consequential societal responses to it. The existing literature, however, sees 
the relation between social space and resistance through the prism of societal opposition to the 
structuring of the space by external agents. Thus, Harvey (1990) and Lefèbvre (1991) described class 
tensions caused by the capitalist control of space, which they saw as one of the capitalist means of 
appropriation. Soja (1989, 86), similarly, saw resistance as an act towards ‘the assertion of space into 
[a] position of historical and social determination’. This paper reveals the relations between space and 
resistance differently, and considers space as a milieu for resistance. Hence, the phenomenon of post-
soviet rural ‘quietness’ is explained through the analysis of diverse spaces for contestation, where, 
despite the existing socio-economic strains, collective protests and mobilisation do not occur. The 
spaces for contestation are understood here as spheres of coexistence and interactions of diverse social 
actors in their everyday responses to various socio-economic strains. These responses, which include 
actions and perceptions, are shaped by the spaces in which they occur, and simultaneously compose 
these spaces; this, in turn, generates recursively reproduced structures that enable or constrain social 
resistance. 
In order to understand the variety of different factors that shape rural ‘quiet’ responses to inequality 
and deprivation, I use Giddens (1984) notions of structures (isolable sets of rules and resources, e.g. 
legal, economic, political structures) and structure (the totality of different structures). I apply these 
concepts to the spaces for contestation. The individual practices and perceptions organized through 
institutions are the elements of social, economic, political, and cultural spaces for contestation. These 
different spaces interact and coalesce with each other, thereby creating a multidimensional space 
which defines the milieu for contentious politics.  
The social space for contestation is represented here by the social ties between actors, their daily 
routines, and their belonging to different social strata, which constrain or enable social mobilisation 
and resistance. By studying the economic space for contestation, I analyse the economic context in 
which the rural dwellers subsist, their formal and informal economic relations, and subjective 
perceptions about the role of peasant economy in the national agricultural system. The political space 
is represented here through the analysis of the relative openness or closeness of the institutionalised 
political system, and through the rural population discourse of the polity. Finally, the cultural space 
for contestation is examined by analysing the prevalent cultural values and norms, which determine 
what passes for legitimate action in a given context.  
Time - or historicization - is an essential component of understanding the dynamics of spaces for 
contestation. Spaces change over time, and are (re)produced based on the past experiences of social 
actors who inhabit these spaces. The recent post-socialist transformations in a number of countries 
have gained significant academic attention. Most of the research is devoted to analysing the market-
led developments in social, economic, or cultural spaces after the collapse of the USSR (Matveev 
2011, Young and Kaczmarek 2008, O'Brien et al. 2005). The socialist past influences the ways in 
which people react to changes, which varies from attempting to escape the ‘unwanted past’ - as, for 
example, in Polish society (Young and Kaczmarek 2008) - to instead returning to Soviet ideals - as 
examined, for instance, by Abramov’s (2013) study of nostalgia in contemporary Russia. The path-
dependent legacies are engrained in everydayness and largely define people's responses to social 
strains.  
Additionally, time has one more role in generating spaces for contestation. In everyday processes, 
time is the factor which defines the moment and duration of social interactions. From this perspective, 
time is a resource which shapes the relations between different social actors. It is similar to the notion 
of time as described by Harvey (1990) in his analysis of capitalism, where time, space, and money 
define the expansion of power. The emergence and expansion of social protests similarly require time 
resources for their organisation. Therefore, time is analysed in this paper as a resource, and as a 
representation of the dynamic nature of spaces for contestation. 
Besides the processes of generation and (re)production of spaces by internal actors, spaces for 
contestation are highly influenced by the state and state-elite coalitions. Lefèbvre explored the state as 
the external agent that produces spaces. According to him ‘the state and each of its constituent 
institutions call for spaces – but spaces which they can then organize according to their specific 
requirements’ (Lefèbvre, 1991: 85). In his book Seeing Like a State, Scott (1998) analysed how high 
modernist states use their power in order to reshape society so that it functions according to the state’s 
plan and will. This paper analyses how the state constrains different spaces for contestation through 
top-down methods of governance and manipulated perceptions. The first set of practices is expressed 
in the creation of objective barriers for civil resistance in different spaces for contestation. The second 
set of state practices aims to design perceptual processes of social actors according to the state policy 
goals. 
 
3. Rural resistance during the Soviet and post-Soviet transformations 
There are ongoing debates on whether the Russian rural population has protested during 70 years of 
socialism, especially during the period of collectivisation - when peasant land and property were 
expropriated in favour of newly created kolkhozy and sovkhozy. Before that, private small 
landholdings were allowed in the countryside. The collectivisation campaign was launched by Stalin 
in 1929-1933 and was aimed at the elimination of private property. The Soviet leadership believed 
that the replacement of individual peasant farms with collective ones would increase the food supply 
for the growing urban population, and generate resources for the country's industrialisation. These 
measures were accompanied by dekulakisation, a campaign of political repression, including arrests, 
deportations, and the executions of millions of the better-off peasants and their families. 
Despite very limited spaces for contestation - the consequence of the state's political repression and 
the peasantry's economic dependency on established collectives - the peasants’ focal protests and 
destructions of collective property occurred during this period of Soviet history. Many authors 
(Campbell 1939, Johnson 2003, Wegren 2005) link the rural dwellers’ response with opposition and 
resistance to the collective farm system. According to Ukrainian nationalist Isaak Mazepa (1934 cited 
in Tottle 1987, 94), at the time, ‘a system of passive resistance was favoured, which aimed at the 
systematic frustration of the Bolshevik plans for the sowing and the gathering of the harvest’. For 
example, many peasants slaughtered their livestock instead of giving it to collective farms. Some 
scholars have interpreted these actions as ideological protest (Campbell 1939, Johnson 2003, Wegren 
2005). Others, however, have noted that these actions were simply aimed at preventing starvation and 
did not constitute an intentional form of protest (Tauger 2005).  
In the later Soviet periods, after collectivisation had been accomplished, a new rural generation with a 
‘typical kolkhoznik mentality’ replaced the people who remembered the painful collectivisation and 
the period preceding it. Collective farming and the Soviet order became more welcomed than resisted 
(Kitching 1998). At the time, the state increasingly subsidized agriculture and, according to Tepicht 
(1975), villagers became significant ‘winners’ of the socialist revolutions. They directly benefitted, 
receiving wages, guaranteed employment and several other social benefits. Rural dwellers were 
allowed – and in the later Soviet period encouraged – to keep small-scale households on lands around 
their houses (0,2 ha on average). This helped people to mitigate food shortages and created additional 
source of family income. At the time, rural households used a whole array of the kolkhozy and 
sovkhozy facilities, from obtaining young livestock and letting private cattle graze on collective 
pastures, to using machinery (Visser et al, 2015).  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia embarked on a course of reforms – which 
Goodman (2003) has called ‘shock therapy’ – with the ultimate goal of preventing a return to 
socialism. Kolkhozy and sovkhozy were restructured, and their lands were distributed by means of 
land shares to their former employees in order to create a system of private family farming. However, 
due to the absence of financial resources and informational support, fragmented and often non-
functioning markets, and rural dwellers’ unwillingness to leave the collectives, the majority of land 
recipients did not become private farmers (Visser and Spoor 2011). Instead, land became accumulated 
in the hands of former kolkhoz/sovkhoz directors, who convinced land recipients to invest their land 
(and property) shares in reorganised farm enterprises in order to preserve collective farming.  
The post-Soviet market-led land reforms of the 1990s revived the debate about rural resistance versus 
adaptation. A common conceptualisation was that the piecemeal emergence of private farms was a 
consequence of villagers’ resistance to land reform (Leonard 2000). This was an idea especially 
adhered to by reformers who placed the blame for the disappointing results of their privatisation 
policies on the rural dwellers (Wegren 2005). In fact, the institutional environment was/still is hostile 
to private farming. Rural dwellers preferred to stay within the collective enterprises, which allowed 
them to adapt and survive in the market economy (Visser 2008). However, the shift from a centralized 
to a market-oriented economy was accompanied by price liberalisation, rising prices for agricultural 
inputs, and the reduction of state support for agriculture, which led to the bankruptcy of many 
kolkhozy and sovkhozy. With the degradation of collective enterprises, rural dwellers lost not only 
their jobs, but also the collectives’ support to their households, which drastically affected their 
subsistence (Visser 2003). 
The post-Soviet transition period was characterised by the ruralisation of poverty (Spoor 2013). 
Bogdanovskii (2005) reports that agricultural wages in 1990 (before the transition began) were 95% 
of the average monthly wage, but had fallen to 40% of the average by 2002. The peak of rural poverty 
was in 1999, when 73.1% of villagers had incomes lower than the subsistence level (Independent 
Institute for Social Policy 2002). Many rural residents, especially the young people, ‘voted with their 
feet’ and moved to cities. Those who remained in the villages became highly dependent on 
subsistence farming on their household plots, experienced social exclusions, and succumbed to 
depressions, alcoholism, and poor health.  
Land sales became legalised in 2002, which attracted new players to the Russian land market. 
Domestic oligarchs and foreign land investors started acquiring large tracks of farmland, spurred by 
the global financial and food crises. They practiced land acquisitions or long-term renting agreements 
with the rural population, or purchased the entire collective farms. Currently, 83.2% of farmland is 
controlled by LFEs (Rosstat 2014). Although many rural dwellers remain the official landowners, the 
existing power discrepancies prevent them from deriving benefits from their land. The long-term land 
renting agreements often imply a very small (in kind) payment to the landowners, and offer almost no 
termination or renegotiation options. The various fraudulent schemes land right violations under 
which land investors accumulate their lands allowed Visser and Spoor (2011) to characterize this 
process as an instance of land grabbing. Furthermore, LFEs practice control grabs – cases when large 
business controls agricultural value-chain and accumulates the majority of state subsidies to 
agriculture, thereby preventing the development of small-scale entrepreneurship in rural areas. 
Visser et al. (2015) argue that land reform was not re-distributive: rural dwellers continued cultivating 
their small-scale household plots, while kolkhozy and sovkhozy were transformed into LFEs. The 
main changes were the significant reduction of social support to rural households and rural areas 
(which had previously been provided by the collectives) and the decrease of employment 
opportunities in the countryside. LFEs invested a great deal in the development of large-scale 
industrial farming, while needing significantly less labour than former kolkhozy and sovkhozy. 
Kalugina and Fadeeva (2010) estimated the current real rural unemployment at 55%. Those who are 
employed receive low wages, which are 10% below the official subsistence level (Ogloblin and Brock 
2005). As result, 65% of rural dwellers have per capita incomes below the minimum consumer budget 
(Kalugina 2014), and nearly 20% currently live in deep poverty (Ivolga 2014). 
The debates on post-Soviet peasant engagement in contentious politics were revitalised in the last 
decade. The 2005-2010 period was characterised by the emergence of rural protests near large cities – 
although these protests were not related to rural unemployment and poverty. In suburban regions, 
especially around Moscow, land acquisitions for the purposes of transforming farmland into 
construction sites became a very profitable business (the land price could increase threefold if the land 
status was changed from agricultural to constriction purposes). Land investors used loopholes in the 
Russian legislation and the corruption of authorities and courts to acquire suburban farmland without 
compensating their official owners (Visser et al. 2012, Mamonova and Visser 2014). These land deals 
raised a wave of civil protests in environs of major cities. The social movement Krestyanskiy Front 
[Peasant Front] emerged from such land conflicts and has been defending the property rights of 
deprived land shareholders for 8 years. However, in a previous study (Mamonova, 2014), I revealed 
that the protesters’ subsistence did not depend on the disputed land. The shareholders expected 
material rewards for their contested actions (financial compensation for lost land shares), and as soon 
as their demands were satisfied, they left the movement. At country scale, this social activity was 
rather insignificant. At its zenith, the Krestyanskiy Front had 25,000 members, of which only 5,000 
were active (Russia’s rural population is nearly 37 million people). One of the Front’s leaders, Tamara 
Semenova, said about their inability to mobilise large rural masses: 
Unfortunately, our [rural] population is very passive... very inactive... This applies, in principle, to any 
issue. They can discuss the problem among themselves. But to do something to solve it – no! It is a 
tremendous effort to push them for any action. 
Below I present the explanation of the post-Soviet peasant unwillingness to engage in overt group 
contentious politics based on the analysis of different spheres for contestation.  
 
4. The individualisation of social space, social stratification, and negative 
egalitarianism 
The development of capitalism in rural areas caused significant transformation in rural social life and 
interpersonal networks. Natalia (85) from stanitsa Rasshevatskaya, Novoalexandrovskiy rayon, 
recalls: 
In the past, when we were young, everyone helped each other, supported each other. If you built a house, 
there would always be people to help you. Now – no one does this anymore. People became indifferent 
to each other's problems. Everyone lives in his own little world. [...] And there aren't many local people 
left in the village. A lot of new people, strangers...5 
Despite the long-time developed collectivist features of Soviet rural population, the era of capitalism 
led to the individualization of lifestyle in the countryside. This phenomenon was already noticed by 
Hegel (1955, 238), who stated that the ‘individual has become the son of the bourgeois society’. 
Later, Back (1992) stressed the categorical shift in relations between the individual and society due to 
capitalist development, which led to the individual's isolation from society. The bankruptcy of 
kolkhozy and sovkhozy disrupted the organised daily interactions of rural dwellers and destroyed the 
common ‘kolkhoznik identity’, which caused the social space metamorphosis. The synthesis of space 
now occurs through the dissociation and individualisation of rural households in their survival 
strategies, and the absence of any common ideology that could band individuals together. The 
perception of social space as something disunited and separated clearly appears in Natalia’s statement 
that ‘everyone lives in his own little world’.  
Several facts indicate the separation of individuals from their communities. According to a survey by 
Visser (2008), more than 80% of respondents in the Pskov and Rostov rural regions indicated 
worsening relations with their fellow villagers since 1991. They complained that relations had become 
less friendly and more distant. Nearly a half of the respondents do not participate in village festivals 
anymore. A similar trend was observed by O’Brien et al (2000), who noticed a significant decline in 
community participation since the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
This disunity in everyday life affected mutual support, which is one of the characteristics of the 
peasant ‘moral economy’, as described by Scott (1977). Networks for money lending have become 
smaller (Visser 2008) and the food exchange traditions between rural households have largely 
disappeared. Social interactions are now based on market principles: ‘[...] no, we do not [exchange 
products with other villagers], we sell our milk, and buy their potatoes if needed... We exchange only 
with relatives...’ (interview with Olga (52), the Krasnoye village, the Grachevskiy rayon). This 
separation from society, according to Lefèbvre (2003, 140), who studied everydayness under the 
development of capitalism, generated ‘a social environment of sophisticated exploitation and carefully 
controlled passivity’.  
The fragmentation of social ties within the rural community further occurs due to the transformation 
of geographical space. There is a direct connection between locale (or place for contestation) and 
spaces for contestation. Space is localised in places, where social actors and social goods are situated. 
A dispersed population has ‘the greatest difficulty defining common interests and is the most 
vulnerable to ‘divide and conquer’ efforts from above’ (Fox 1996, 1091). Russian rural settlements 
(similar to many in the former Soviet Union) experience significant depopulation. Over the past 13 
years, 11,000 villages have disappeared from the Russian map. To date, 23.6% of all rural settlements 
have a population of less than 10 people (Rosstat 2014). In the southern regions, Roma people and 
migrants from former Soviet republics inhabit abandoned houses (Ioffe et al. 2013). Rural houses in 
the central region remain abandoned or have been acquired and rebuilt by dachiniks (urban dwellers 
that use village houses as vocational summer or weekend residences) (Mamonova and Sutherland, 
forthcoming). According to statistics, there is no permanent population in 12.7% of the rural 
settlements. Mikhail (57), inhabitant of the Krasnoye village, complains about the absence of 
neighbours:  
Have you seen any neighbours? These are the third neighbours for the last 10 years. Bought-sold-bought-
sold. They work in the city, I don’t see them. The other neighbours immigrated to Germany, their house 
is abandoned... It is not like in the past. Neighbours were neighbours! We planted potatoes together, 
drunk samogon [an alcoholic drink] together. Everything was together. And now I don’t have company 
to plant potatoes, cannot compare whose potatoes are better. I am here by myself...6 
5 Interview conducted by the author in July 2014, in stanitsa Rasshevatskaya, the Novoalexandrovskiy rayon, the Stavropol 
Krai. 
6 Interview conducted by the author in June 2014, the Krasnoye village, the Grachevskiy rayon, the Stavropol Krai. 
                                                          
The transformation of the geographical space over time has influenced the social space for 
contestation. The dispersed place creates spatial obstacles for social cooperation and mobilisation, 
constructs perceptions of disunity among social actors through symbolic elements such as abandoned 
houses, and segregates the community into included (locals) and excluded (in-migrants) subgroups in 
a common social space. These processes destroy social capital and shrink the social space for 
contestation. 
If, in the Soviet period, relative equality was achieved through repressions against middle-class 
peasants (kulaks) and politics of state control over the size and scale of peasant household production, 
the recent neoliberal developments cause stratification within rural communities. Rogers (2009) 
analysed how the changes in access to a productive resource (e.g. a tractor) and the ability to deploy 
labour power (e.g. to cut and collect hay) cause social stratification in Russian villages after the 
collapse of the USSR. This transformed social relations and divided rural dwellers into ‘givers’ and 
‘takers’. The inequality between these two groups is deepened by unemployment (ibid, 210). In my 
other study (Mamonova, 2015), I explain the contemporary stratification through the different 
response strategies of post-Soviet peasants to capitalism. I reveal that adaptive response strategies 
lead to more favourable positions in rural strata. For example, peasants who choose to occupy market 
niches free from the LFEs’ presence (i.e. time- and labour-intensive farming) achieve significant 
independence and have higher incomes. Those who do not undergo any transformations in their 
lifestyle get impoverished and marginalised. I distinguished the following rural strata: family farmers 
(who compete with LFEs), odnoosibniks (independent peasants), peasant-workers (engaged in 
subsistence agriculture, but who also conduct wage work), pensioners’ households (whose major 
income comes from social transfers), and marginals (who refuse to adapt to new life conditions).  
It is difficult to define common goals and mobilise people for organised protests in a highly stratified 
community. For example, many livestock keepers want to withdraw their land plots, which were 
distributed during the land reform but remain in LFEs’ possession. The LFEs’ reluctance to return 
these lands to rural dwellers causes tensions and social unrest. Other villagers, in contrast, are tolerant 
towards LFEs but dissatisfied with rural unemployment and the meagre LFE support offered to 
households. Family farmers, in turn, complain about the LFEs’ land and control grabs. Lubov (61), a 
retired teacher from the Krasnoye village, who now represents the interests of veterans in the village 
council, stated about the difficulties of mobilising rural dwellers for a collective action: ‘when they 
get together, they act like “swan, pike and crawfish7”; everyone pulls to their own side, and the 
situation does not change at all8’.  
Cooperation does exist; however, it is often within the same social stratum and related to common 
household work activities. Thus, peasants graze their livestock together on common lands and 
establish a rotation of herdsmen from each household. Family farmers often borrow farm machinery 
from each other, but the disunity between them does not allow them to create a common equipment 
base or achieve economies of scope by uniting their labour or possessions. According to the UroRAN 
survey (2011), 77.5% of respondents want to do business only with direct family members, avoiding 
any fixed obligations and cooperation with fellow-villagers or even their distant relatives (Gonin 
2013). This mutual distrust leads to what Hardin (1968) described as the ‘tragedy of commons’: 
individuals act independently according to their self-interests, which contradicts the whole group's 
long-term best interests. Thus, many joint farmer groups created in the beginning of the land reform in 
the Novoalexandrovskiy rayon have fallen apart. Out of 5 large farmers groups established in 1992 in 
stanitsa Rasshevatskaya, 15 farmers split off and established their own small farms by the 2014. One 
of those farmers, Yuri (30), explained this separation: ‘we worked together, but the result was 
7 ‘Swan, pike and crawfish’ is a fable, written by the Russian fable writer Ivan Krylov in 1814. The writer highlights the 
disconnection of collective actions and their resulting ineffectiveness: ‘Once Crawfish, Swan and Pike set out to pull a 
loaded cart, and all together settled in the traces; they pulled with all their might, but still the cart refused to budge! The load 
it seemed was not too much for them: yet Crawfish scrambled backwards, Swan strained up skywards, Pike pulled toward 
the sea. Who's guilty here and who is right is not for us to say - but anyway the cart's still there today’. 
8 Interview conducted by the author in June 2014, the Krasnoye village, the Grachevskiy rayon, the Stavropol Krai. 
                                                          
negative, we were not able to agree on the right management of the farm. Too many “I”, nothing 
about “we”’9.  
The rural stratification generates tensions in rural communities. However, it would be wrong to call 
them class struggles. The classes of bourgeoisie and proletariat have not been formed, as the main 
means of production – land and capital – remained in the LFEs possession; on the contrary, partial 
repeasantisation has occurred in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union (Mamonova et al. 
2013). The existing tensions can be explained by ‘negative egalitarianism’, when better-off peasants 
are attacked by their less fortunate fellows, who long for equalisation. Sergey (55), a village 
veterinarian who owns 15 cows in his household, recently received an official petition from his 
neighbours with a demand to eliminate his cows because of their smell:  
What are they against? The smell? Come on! 10 years ago every household had cows! They walked 
along the central street. There was a herd of 100 heads in the village. And now what? Only two other 
people and I hold livestock. I keep my cows at the end the street. And it still smells! They organised a 
gathering, wrote a petition to the local administration, and demanded that I move my stable outside the 
village. I don’t have land to move it.10 
Of course, this situation might be explained by the lifestyle transformation in the countryside: many 
people found jobs in urban centres and became daily migrant workers instead of peasants. However, 
that is true for the younger generation in the Krasnoye village, while Sergey indicated that the petition 
was written by people of his age and older, who maintain a rural lifestyle. This is not an isolated 
example of people taking actions against their neighbours. Visser (2008) reveals that stealing from 
fellow-villagers has become more common, contrary to the Soviet past, when this behaviour was very 
rare (Humphrey 1983). Negative egalitarianism can be expressed in even more destructive forms. 
Farmer Alexander from the Krasnoye village provides an example how villagers punish their fellows 
for evident success: ‘...his wife nags him every day: “look, your neighbour is doing well and you are 
doing nothing”. One day he burns his neighbour’s house and is happy: the neighbour is nothing too 
now.’ According to Wegren (2013), this destructive envy gives a new meaning to social justice; 
intracommunity punishment of better-off peasants acts as a hammer, which ‘hammer[s] down the 
nails that “stick up”’ (ibid, 11). This destroys solidarity and propensity for collective actions. 
 
 
5. The duality of the agricultural system and perceived economic space and time  
The economic structures that are dominant in rural areas sharpen interactions between rural dwellers 
and other social actors and institutions, and therefore define the possibilities for collective actions.  
The bankruptcy and reorganisations of kolkhozy and sovkhozy have drastically affected rural 
employment. LFEs use labour saving technologies and economies of scale, therefore only employing 
a minor part of the rural population11. Although during the last decade registered rural unemployment 
became lower than in the 1990s (VNIIESH, 2011 reports it between 10 and 20% depending on the 
region), Kalugina and Fadeeva (2010) estimate the real unemployment at 55%. High unemployment 
has a profound effect on the sources, structure, and distribution of household income. One of its 
consequences is that household food production became the major source of family subsistence 
(Wegren 2005). To date, more than 32% of the total income of an average rural household comes 
from agricultural production on their household plots, and only 30% of the income comes from wage 
employment. For the largest part of low-income rural families, the income from household farming 
9 Interview conducted by the author in July 2014, in stanitsa Rasshevatskaya, the Novoalexandrovskiy rayon, the Stavropol 
Krai. 
10 Interview conducted by the author in June 2014, the Krasnoye village, the Grachevskiy rayon, the Stavropol Krai. 
11 For example, the population of stanitsa Rasshevatskaya, Novoalexandrovskiy rayon, is more than 5 000 people. In the 
Soviet past, nearly all of them were employed by the ‘Rodina’ kolkhoz. At the moment, only 12 people work in the 
reorganised LFE ‘Rodina’ (data from fieldwork).  
                                                          
contributes up to 70% of the family income12 (Ogloblin and Brock 2006). This small-scale food 
production has a largely subsistent character: 75% of household produce is consumed within the 
household, while only 25% is sold (Timonina and Litvinoca 2009).  
In 2013, rural households produced 82.3% of the country's potatoes; 69.4% of the vegetables; 61.1% 
of cattle meat; 71.5% of sheep and goat meat; 48.3% of milk; and 93.3% of honey. In total, they 
contribute to 41.1% of gross domestic agricultural output, while cultivating only 5.3% of agricultural 
land in the country (Rosstat 2014). Rural households are very productive and resource efficient (in 
terms of material inputs), however, they are often considered ‘backward’, ‘relics of the past’, and 
‘without long term perspective’ (Visser et al., 2015). The majority of state programmes are aimed at 
the development of large-scale industrial agriculture, which requires significant subsidisation and is, 
in fact, inefficient (Spoor et al., 2013). However, the generalised belief that ‘big is beautiful’ defines 
the current economic practices. The post-socialist legacies and the contemporary distribution of 
economic capital create an economic space in which rural households are underestimated both by 
state institutions and society. Rural dwellers do not perceive their subsistence agriculture as an 
alternative to large-scale farming. Household farming is still referred to (both formally and 
informally) as a subsidiary personal agriculture [lichnoye podsobnoye khoziaystvo], being seen by the 
rural population as a necessary, but still auxiliary production. The majority of rural dwellers would 
decrease their food production if their incomes from other activities (wage work) increased (Nefedova 
2008). According to Novokhatskaya (2008, 56), rural people ‘were not and will not be able to accept 
the current situation as permanent and a fortiori perspective for their life’.  
The societal subjective underestimation of rural household economy creates no internal stimuli to 
defend the position of peasant agriculture in the national farm system. However, the defence is not 
always required, as the politics of LFEs do not directly jeopardise rural households’ subsistence. In 
many Latin American or African countries, peasants were displaced from their lands (or from their 
traditional markets) due to land grabbing; by comparison, large-scale land acquisitions in post-Soviet 
countries were carried out with no physical displacement, nor the exclusion of small-scale producers 
from agricultural market (Mamonova, 2015). Rural households produce labour- and time-intensive 
products for domestic consumption, and therefore do not compete with LFEs, which are mainly 
focused on grain production for export. De Schutter (2011) has mentioned a similar situation as a 
possible coexistence scenario, in which large-scale agricultural commodities are shipped abroad, 
while the food security in the home country is guaranteed by small-scale producers. The segmentation 
of agricultural markets allows peasants and LFEs to peacefully coexist in different market segments.  
However, if the economic interests of LFEs and rural households collide, conflict is unavoidable – 
and its resolution is, as a rule, not in favour of the last ones. In 2012, the African swine fever was 
diagnosed in some regions of Russia, which led to an organised mass slaughtering of pigs at large and 
(predominantly) small farms. In several villages in the Stavropol Krai, the people I spoke with 
reported that swine fever was an instrument to displace rural households and family farmers from the 
pork meat market; at which time, many LFEs began large-scale pork production. Yuri (57) used to 
keep pigs in the Krasnoye village:  
There was a campaign to strangle us. First were revisions, control checks, then they [epidemiological 
service] forced us to build a high fence, then there was a rule: no more than 5 pigs per household. And 
then, finally, this fever. I don’t know if it was a real fever. Some pigs just die, it is normal... but they said 
it was a fever and killed all pigs in the village. [...] They needed to clean the space for the new pig farm 
complex, which was built in Svetlograd. Now it’s the major pork producer in the rayon13.  
12 However, this proportion varies across different social groups. Thus, according to the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring 
Survey (2000-2003), in 24.6% of the high-income households, farming accounts for less than 5% of total income, while 
74.1% of it comes from employment. At the same time, for 21.9% of households in the low-income group, farming is the 
source of 70.0% of total income, whereas the share of income from employment is only 7.8%. These differences in the rural 
population's income create high inequality: The poorest ten percent of rural Russians earn 10 times less than the most well-
off decile (Ogloblin and Brock 2006) 
13 Interview conducted by the author in June 2014, the Krasnoye village, the Grachevskiy rayon, the Stavropol Krai. 
                                                          
This expulsion of small-scale producers from the pork market, allegedly pursued by LFEs in 
alignment with state authorities, has caused diverse rural responses across Russia. Visser et al. (2015) 
observed protests among rural households in the Belgorod region: people wrote letters to newspapers, 
organized demonstrations, blocked roads, and even gathered in a small social movement (‘Kolos’). 
However, these efforts were not met with significant success. The state-elite coalition creates a bias in 
state policy which makes it difficult for small-scale producers to defend their economic interests. In 
the Stavropol Krai, the pig slaughtering caused no significant resistance. Rural household economies 
are very diversified, and with the loss of one income source they quickly reorient to other farm 
activities. The difference between the Belgorod resistance and the Stavropolskiy ‘quietness’ can be 
explained by different syntheses of the economic space for contestation. The first case is rather 
exceptional: the rural income in the Belgorod region is among the highest in Russia, and the regional 
government encourages rural entrepreneurship (Dorofeev et al. 2014). This might be the reason for 
the emergence of more positive perceptions about peasant economy, than elsewhere in Russia, and 
could generate the economic incentives for rural dwellers to defend their small-scale production.  
As with social space, time is an essential component of understanding the dynamics of the economic 
space for contestation. On the one hand it is expressed through an inclination towards the further 
latifundisation and eradication of small-scale farmers at the national level, on the other – it is a crucial 
resource in peasant economy. As it was mentioned already, rural households are engaged in time-
intensive agriculture and often keep livestock, which require daily and even hourly care. Low prices 
for milk collection trigger frustrations and dissatisfactions among small-scale milk producers (for 
example, in the Grachevskiy rayon, people have to sell their milk for 10 rubles per litre, which is 
below their production costs, while the end price of 1 litre of milk in supermarkets is 40 rubles and 
higher). However, their gathering and collective protest are impossible, not only due to the earlier 
discussed constrains, but also because of the time shortage for activities other than farming. Olga (52) 
explained: ‘if we protest, who will milk our cows? We can’t leave them and go to protest.’ Time is a 
resource here, which is needed for organisation of and(or) participation in contentious politics. The 
economic transition of the 1990s resulted in the institutionalization of private land ownership, and 
gave rural residents opportunities to expand their land plots and increase food production in order to 
guarantee subsistence for their families. If in 1992 the average land plot size in possession of a rural 
family was 0.2 ha, it has more than doubled by 2011 (0.47 ha per household) (Spoor et al., 2013). 
While the scale and size of the agricultural production have increased, labour resources have 
decreased as many young people left their villages for urban jobs. Maria (53), who cultivates a 
household plot of 0.7 ha together with her husband and mother-in-law, and keeps various livestock, 
said:  
...you ask me if I have free time. Have you seen my household? Do you think I have this free time? We 
wake up at 5 in the morning and go to sleep late in the night. [...] How else could we support our three 
sons? [..] They all are in cities now.14 
One of the factors which create the rural disengagement from contentious politics, according to Ergil 
(1977), is the economic dependence. Visser et al. (2015) mentioned the symbiosis between 
smallholdings and LFEs as one of the defining factors for ‘quiet’ food sovereignty in Russia. In the 
Soviet past, rural households were allowed to use a whole array of collective facilities, from obtaining 
young livestock and letting private cattle graze on collective pastures, to using machinery. Moreover, 
‘aside from the support provided to households, there was also a wide practice of goods being taken 
(pilfered) by the households’ (Visser et al. ibid, XX). These days, LFEs pay rent in-kind (grain and 
sometimes other produce) to rural dwellers in order to use the land plots distributed to them during the 
land reform. In my other paper (Mamonova, 2015) I viewed these payments as a formalisation and 
downscaling of former kolkhozy/sovkhozy support to their workers. Although these payments are 
rather insignificant in a household budget, they provide additional stable income. Ludmila (51) 
explained the importance of in-kind-payments for her household and why she does not want to sell 
her land shares:  
14 Interview conducted by the author in July 2014, the Arzgir village, the Arzgirskiy rayon, the Stavropol Krai. 
                                                          
There is a new investor who wants to buy our shares. He gives 100,000 rubbles for a share. It is, of course, 
a lot of money, but they will disappear immediately. Everything is very expensive these days. No, it is 
better to receive grain for our shares. It’s not enough to feed our cows; we have to buy additional grain. 
But this is enough to feed our sheep15.  
Pilfering still exists in rural areas. Although some LFEs are trying to fight this behaviour, the costs of 
control and theft investigations often exceed the losses from peasant pilfering; many companies have 
to accept these small losses as a part of daily routine and call them the ‘angels' share’ (Visser and 
Mamonova 2011). Meanwhile, for poor households, these little thefts are additional source of 
subsistence. These economic arrangements create an objectivised and subjectivised dependency of 
peasant households on LFEs, which prevents rural dwellers from challenging the existing order in the 
economic space for contestation.  
 
6. Naive monarchism and state-elite coalitions in the political space for contestation 
When asked who is to blame for the woes of their household and for the problems in rural areas, rural 
people unanimously answered: ‘the government’. In their discourses about wrongdoings in the 
countryside (such as the bankruptcy of kolkhozy/sovkhozy, farmland abandonment, the destruction of 
village infrastructure, price politics that discriminate small-scale producers, etc.) peasants usually use 
the word ‘they’ to allude to the state-elite coalitions. At the same time, the head of the government – 
president Putin – is seen by the majority of rural residents in a positive light. Natalia (85) from 
stanitsa Rasshevatskaya, the Novoalexandrovskiy rayon said: 
I support Putin. He is a good man. He increased our pensions [...] He makes it better for people, but you 
cannot be a warrior when you are alone in the field16. He cannot cover everything. The local authorities 
are those who do things wrongly17.  
The belief of rural dwellers in the president’s good will is shaped by historical legacies. Traditionally, 
Russian peasants’ attitude to various state representatives was heterogeneous. The Tsar and his 
actions were recognized unconditionally, whereas all the failures were ascribed to officials, who, 
according to peasants’ beliefs, deliberately misrepresented the Tsar’s will. This so-called ‘naive 
monarchism’ prevailed in Tsarist Russia and was observed during the Soviet period (Mamonova, 
forthcoming). The folk proverb ‘pridet tsar-batyushka i vseh rassudit’ (the tsar-dear father will come 
and judge us all) remains representative of rural attitudes to contestations in Russia. In 2008, there 
was an organised Peasant Walk to the president in order to draw his attention to the problems in rural 
areas. At the time, peasants from the Krasnodarskiy Kray, the Omsk, and Moscow regions, organised 
by the social movement Krestyanskiy Front, came to the Red Square in Moscow to talk with the 
president. However, the president ignored the walkers’ arrival and the people-president dialogue did 
not occur (see Mamonova, forthcoming, for analysis of naïve monarchism and rural resistance in 
contemporary Russia).  
The naive monarchism is strongly reinforced by the state-controlled mass media. Hopstad (2011) 
described how Russian news agencies are “guided” to promote the presidential autonomy, while being 
free to criticize local and regional authorities. Manipulated perceptions, according to Lefèbvre (1991), 
are among the mechanisms of space representation. Space might be built from the inside by its actors, 
but it is also constructed by outsiders through the system of institutions, in this case state-controlled 
mass media. Belief in a good national leader prevents the appearance of any political movements 
among rural dwellers, who have significantly less access to independent media sources than urbanites.  
Contestation of lower level authorities does exist. However, because of a lack of solidarity among 
rural dwellers, it is often expressed in individual protests. Formally, the legal system provides a 
number of possibilities for the population to defend their interests; however, when the dissent is 
15 Interview conducted by the author in July 2014, the Arzgir village, the Arzgirskiy rayon, the Stavropol Krai. 
16 Russian folk proverb; it is similar in meaning to the British ‘no man is an island’ 
17 Interview was conducted by the author in July 2014, in stanitsa Rasshevatskaya, the Novoalexandrovskiy rayon, the 
Stavropol Krai. 
                                                          
related to highly politicised issues, the outcome is not in favour of the deprived. Rolfes and Mohrman 
(2000) analysed villagers’ formal appeals to local courts in the Vladimir region. They revealed that, 
when peasants asserted their rights to land and property shares that had been lost due to land grabbing, 
their appeals were stuck in a ‘series of dead ends and refusals’ (ibid, 13). The state-elite coalition in 
the countryside makes it nearly impossible for peasants to defend their interests in an open, legalised 
way. The ‘milk mafia’ – a covert alliance of milk-processing businessmen and regional authorities 
which controls prices for the milk collection from rural households – is spread throughout Russia and 
Ukraine, where rural households are the main milk producers. As previously mentioned, villagers in 
the Grachevskiy rayon receive 10 rubles per 1 little of milk from milk collectors. However, the 
manager of the Stavropol Milk Factory, the company responsible for milk collection in this rayon, 
declared that milk is collected from the local population at the price of 20 rubles per litre18. The local 
authorities ignore the disappearance of 10 rubles from the price of each litre. The appearance of any 
other milk collectors in the rayon (who could give a better price to milk producers) is heavily 
restricted by the ‘milk mafia’19. Rural dwellers sell their milk below its production costs, but do not 
have the courage to protest – they remember the example of their fellow villager who attempted to 
complain. A cow-keeper, Olga (52), shares this story: 
There was one woman with cows. The price is too small, you can’t survive. Her sister decided to help 
her. She wrote a letter to the governor about that. [...] Well, the governor considered it, and sent it to the 
SMF [Stavropol Milk Factory] with an order to solve the problem. SMF ordered: no more milk to be 
collected from this woman. That was it... She tried to sell milk by herself, make cottage cheese, but 
nothing worked out. Finally, she had to slaughter her cows. No one wants to complain anymore.  
In different conditions, previous failure may raise even stronger resistance (see Hirschman’s (1984) 
‘principle of conservation and mutation of social energy’). However, the mutation of social energy 
does not occur in rural Russia because of the highly individualised social space for contestation with 
no solidarity between its actors, and the peasant disbelief in the potentials of small-scale economy.  
 
7. Soviet nostalgia and manipulated perceptions in the cultural space for contestation 
Embodied cultural capital is important for explaining the limited cultural space for contestation. The 
system of knowledge, skills and values which were acquired during individuals’ lifetime, as well as 
inherited from previous generations, is expressed in the daily practices of the rural population and 
their perceptions about the politics of change and contestation.  
Such issues as land grabbing and the development of large-scale industrial agriculture – which in 
other contexts cause protests among diverse rural groups and mobilise them into global peasant 
movements such as La Via Campesina or MST – are not recognised as a problem or subject to change 
in Russia. First, large-scale land acquisitions by LFEs are socially accepted in Russia. LFEs are seen 
as the successors of kolkhozy and sovkhozy by the rural population (Mamonova 2015). People still 
call them ‘kolkhozy’ and ‘sovkhozy’. The persistence of old terms not only expresses the habits of 
colloquial speech, but also demonstrates the actual and perceived continuity of the dual system of 
agricultural production: large-scale “collective” agriculture versus small-scale peasant subsistence 
farming. Nikulin (2011) even applies the term ‘post-kolkhoz’ to contemporary LFEs to stress the 
continuity of collective farming. Furthermore, the use of Soviet language in contemporary speech 
demonstrates the rural population's strong nostalgia for the Soviet past.  
This nostalgia holds one of the central positions in the contemporary post-Soviet cultural space. 
Abramov (2013) indicates the identity crisis as the major reason for the Soviet nostalgia. Indeed, as it 
was mentioned early in this paper, the ‘shock therapy’ during the post-socialist transformation period 
destroyed the kolkhoznik-identity but did not give rural dwellers the opportunity to develop new 
identities. Moreover, the contemporary rural residents remember the Brezhnev period of the 1980s 
18 Interview was conducted by the author in July 2014 in the city of Stavropol, the Stavropolskiy Kray. 
19 Information from many interviews with small-scale milk producers, and confirmed in a private conversation with 
Ekaterina Agalarova, PhD, Associate Professor of the Department of Economics and Business technology business in 
agribusiness at the State Agricultural University of Stavropol, June-July 2014.  
                                                          
with highly subsidised agriculture, which was widely seen as ‘a golden era, a time of stability, 
economic abundance, national pride, social justice and the belief in the future’ (Humphrey 2002, 141). 
The villagers’ dissatisfaction with reality and their uncertainty about the future generate the cultural 
space, where large-scale collective farming is seen as a salvation from rural problems. Heady and 
Gambold-Miller (2006), for instance, showed in one of their case-studies that peasants welcomed the 
revitalisation of an abandoned kolkhoz by a new investor, hoping to return to the ‘good old times’. 
No new values have emerged in the post-Soviet cultural space to potentially lessen this nostalgia. The 
peasant way of life, which is used by peasant movements as an alternative to large-scale agriculture in 
other countries, is not recognised by Russian rural dwellers because of the societal beliefs that ‘big is 
beautiful’ and small is ‘backward’. The value of food sovereignty in La Via Campesina's 
interpretation is also absent from the post-Soviet countryside. The lack of spread of international 
peasant values occurs due to the rural society’s hostility towards new ideals, and the state’s modelling 
of cultural spaces for contestation. The Putin government restricts the activities of foreign CSOs and 
NGOs in Russia in order to prevent the inflow of the “western” values from outside the country, 
which could challenge of existing order and cause social unrest20.  
The role of the state in shaping the spaces for contestation through manipulated perceptions is 
especially visible in the cultural space. The indirect manipulation of people’s opinions about protests 
is a much more effective state strategy of societal control, than direct repressions of opposition. In the 
post-socialist context, civil disobedience and sabotage are often regarded as ‘uncivil’ and, therefore, 
unacceptable behaviour (Jacobsson 2012). Shevchenko (2009, 73) links the negative attitude towards 
open mobilisation in Russia to the prevailing belief that ‘rebellions never improve the situation, but 
only make it worse’. According to her ethnographic research in urban Russia, people see the attempts 
to dedicate oneself to reforming the discredited system as ‘naïve and self-defeating’. These 
perceptions are maintained and reinforced by the Putin government through mass media, thereby 
(re)producing the structures in which protest is not culturally acceptable. According to an interview 
with Natalia (27), an activist from the town of Mytischi, ‘the state uses mass media in order to 
propagate that it is stupid to protest, that nothing can be changed... and people believe this’21.  
The state engineering of societal perceptions through the informational policy allows Putin to pursue 
his national and foreign politics with the support of (or lack of opposition among) Russian citizens. 
The civil society, which could contest state actions, is very weak; as Mamonova and Visser (2014) 
have shown, social movements and political parties, which aim to defend the interests of the rural 
population, are more likely state marionettes or phantom movements with concealed goals. The 
majority of Russians view state restrictions of civil society organisations positively; this is especially 
the case in rural areas, where the population is more conservative and more supportive of the regime 
than in the cities. A survey found that 72% of the respondents thought that the state should monitor 
the motives behind civil society organisations’ charitable activity (Chebankova 2012). The state's 
negative propaganda on, for instance, foreign CSOs and NGOs, is also widely shared by the 
population. Therefore, the culture of protest is underdeveloped in rural Russia, while the existing 
order is seen through the prism of Soviet nostalgia, which makes it socially accepted. 
 
8. Conclusion  
This study analysed the ‘quietness’ of the post-Soviet rural dwellers, who do not defend their interests 
through organized groups protest and social mobilisation, despite their socio-economic exclusion, 
deep poverty, and land rights deprivations,.  
20 However, the absence of international peasant values does not necessarily mean the absence of similar, internally 
developed, categories. Visser et al. (2015) reveal the existence of a ‘quiet food sovereignty’ in Russia, or ‘food sovereignty 
without a movement’. However, they assert that quiet food sovereignty does not challenge the overall food system directly 
through its produce, claims, or ideas, but focuses rather on individual economic benefits, and - in the case of urban dwellers 
engaged in farming - a culturally appropriate form of sociality, generated by the exchange of self-produced food. The quiet 
food sovereignty is too diffuse and implicit to question the existing order.  
21 Interview conducted by the author on a train from Sergiev Posad to Moscow, in April 2013. 
                                                          
This paper identified various factors that explain rural ‘quietness’, by analysing social, economic, 
political and cultural spaces for contestation. These spaces represent spheres of coexistence and 
interactions of rural dwellers in their daily responses to various socio-economic strains. The results 
indicate that the individualisation and social space segregation of Russian rural dwellers prevent the 
generation of social capital, which is important for organised group actions. The legacy of large 
versus small-scale farming and the segmentation of agricultural markets create coexistence conditions 
for LFEs and rural households in the economic space. The Soviet nostalgia, which dominates the 
cultural space, reinforces the existing dual structure of agriculture and prevents the emergence of any 
new ideas that may question the generalised norms and beliefs. Though the political space for 
contestation is highly constrained by the contemporary regime, the existing order is preserved to a 
larger extent by the ‘naïve monarchist’ sentiments of the rural population and by the state-
manipulated perceptions of the ‘unciviliness’ of social protest, than by the direct repressions of civil 
disobedience. 
Regardless of the abovementioned factors, however, this research did reveal some forms of resistance 
in rural Russia. This resistance is largely expressed in individual protest actions, such as writing 
petitions to courts and authorities. However, these protests do not develop into mass collective 
actions. As shown in this paper, such individual attempts have often been frustrated and ended in 
repression. Contrary to Hirschman’s principle of social energy mutation, these unsuccessful individual 
protests are not increasingly renewed and accumulated to reappear in a form of collective resistance. 
The absence of moral sentiments within rural communities prevents the emergence of mutual 
sympathy and solidarity-driven activities. The self-interested, isolated individual, who chooses 
rationally between alternative courses of action, has become representative of the post-soviet 
countryside. Although the individualisation of the rural social space is caused more by the destruction 
of kolkhozy and sovkhozy than by capitalist development, capitalist norms and values (such as 
individualism and market-based relations) have nevertheless penetrated the rural life, substituting 
food exchange traditions and mutual support (which had been the main characteristics of the peasant 
moral economy). Moreover, negative egalitarianism creates obstacles for rural dwellers to act in a 
group-oriented way. Instead of mobilising their efforts to punish their oppressors, rural dwellers 
engage in community destructing activities, such as writing petitions against each other, damaging 
properties, and stealing from each other.  
As this study has shown, the observed rural ‘quietness’ does not necessarily imply the absence of all 
forms of resistance. This ‘quietness’ creates more of an illusion of peace. Whereas the open rural 
protest is rare and more individually based, hidden forms of resistance may be detected in the Russian 
countryside. Nikulin (2011) considers stealing and foot-dragging at LFEs as examples of the 
villagers’ everyday resistance, similar to what Scott described as the ‘weapons of the weak’. 
However, stealing from collective farms had partly been institutionalised during the later Soviet 
period as a source of additional income for the rural population. Humphrey (1983) discovered that the 
Soviet villagers used the word theft to refer only to stealing from each other, while the appropriations 
of collective farm belongings were referred to as takes. These takes remain popular in contemporary 
rural Russia and are a part of the symbiotic relations between rural dwellers and LFEs. The empirical 
research for this paper revealed a number of small-scale thefts from LFEs and farmers, which were 
inconsistently related to conflict situations, and therefore were not necessarily examples of hidden 
resistance. Moreover, these thefts (no matter their origin) only satisfy rural needs for food or 
vengeance, and do not represent a significant force of change in the existing order. Many LFEs have 
accepted these small losses as part of the daily routine and do not change their corporate behaviour 
accordingly.  
However, under what conditions may these hidden rural acts and individual protests develop into 
more open and organised collective action? The answer can be found in the multidimensional space 
for contestation. The social, economic, political and cultural spaces are dynamic structures and change 
over time. The transformation of one element may cause consequent changes in all spaces for 
contestation, thus transforming the milieu for resistance. An empirical example is that of the different 
rural responses to state actions against the swine flu in the Stavropol Krai and the Belgorod region. As 
this paper showed, a better economic objective and perceived status of rural dwellers in the Belgorod 
region (in comparison to other Russian regions) has expanded the economic space for contestation, 
which generated transformations in other spheres of everyday life, and consequently led to a group 
mobilisation for the protection of smallholder rights. Another example is the LFEs’ recent tendency to 
end the symbiosis between them and the rural households (Visser et al, 2015), which creates fewer 
stimuli among the rural population to support large-scale agriculture. To date, it does not lead to 
significant changes in the spaces for contestation; however, if villagers’ decreasing economic 
dependency on LFEs coincides with transformations in other spaces of everyday life, rural politics 
might change. Therefore, the factors that define the contemporary rural ‘quietness’ should be studied 
in their full complexity, but analysing their impact concurrently.  
This research introduced the subject of rural post-soviet ‘quietness’ to the current debates on peasant 
politics and collective mobilisation. It demonstrates that, despite the observed peacefulness and lack 
of rural protests in Russia, various movements and tensions do emerge. The existing order is 
preserved by a combination of various social, economic, cultural and political factors; the absence of 
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